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lishing a crime, a legislature must fix an ascertainable standard of guilt, so that
01
those subject thereto may regulate their conduct in accordance with the act.
In the recovery acts, however, the filing of the codes Will have established the
standard of guilt, and it is recognized that the legislatures may delegate the
power to9 2make rules and regulations and provide that violations shall constitute
a crime.

THE SATISFACTION o

GOLD CLAUSE OBLIGATIONS BY LEGAL TENDER PAPER.

Not until 1867 did anyone seriously litigate1 what Charles Pinckney meant
when he successfully urged upon the Constitutional Convention - that the document it was then formulating confer upon the Congress the power "To coin
money" and "regulate the value thereof." 3 During that year and those that
have followed, however, the Supreme Court of the United States on four occasions 4 has been called upon to declare what this government's founders contemplated when they incorporated this provision into the paramount law of the
land.5 Confessedly, numerous other powers delegated in terms to the national
91. United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81 (1921); Connally v. General
Const. Co., 269 U. S. 385 (1926); Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U. S. 445 (1926); Champlain Rfg. Co. v. Commission, 286 U. S. 210 (1931).
92. United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506, 522 (1911). ("A violation of reasonable
rules regulating the use and occupancy of the property is made a crime, not by the
Secretary, but by Congress. The statute, not the Secretary, fixes the penalty."). Accord:
Avent v. United States 266 U. S. 127 (1924); Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.
S. 394 (1928); cf. Broadbine v. Inhabitants of Town of Revere, 182 Mass. 598, 66 N. E.
607 (1903).
1. Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U. S. 603 (1869), was frst argued before the United
States Supreme Court during the December term of 1867. It is scarcely necesary to remark that the question had already been determined in state courts as well as inferior
federal tribunals.
2. In the draft of the Constitution proposed by Mr. Pinckney tiere appeared a coinage
clause virtually identical with that ultimately adopted. See 1 Er.rxoT, Dmnum (2d ed.
1836) 184.
3. While other litigation, not unrelated to this grant of power, arose at substantilly
the same time and resulted in a line of decisions of which Bronson v. Rodes, 74 U. S.
229 (1868), may be regarded as the parent, it was considerably narrower in scope and
concerned chiefly an interpretation of the terms of the Legal Tender Acts, the Court
holding the provisions thereof were not intended to extend to contracts expreEsly made
payable in gold and silver coin.
4. Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U. S. 603 (1869); Legal Tender Cases, Knox v. Lee,
Parker v. Davis, 79 U. S. 457 (1871); Juiliard v. Greenman, 110 U. S. 421 (1884);
These last decisions are divided as follows:
Gold Clause Cases, 55 Sup. Ct. 407 (1935).
Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., United States et al. v. Bankers' Trust Co. et al.
(two cases), ibid.; Nortz v. United States, id. at 428; Perry v. United States, id. at 432.
For the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice M Reynolds, applicable to all the cases.,
id. at 419.
5. U. S. Co-,sr. Art. I, § 8. "The Congress shall have the power . . . To coin money,
regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin... ..

FORDEAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4

legislative body were considered in determining the constitutionality of the application of definitely artificial stimuli to the currency, but the coinage clause,
even when not the turning point of the controversy, is still either a strong citadel
about which the defense is deployed, or a hostile fortress against which the
attack must be levelled.
Although the Legal Tender Cases0 furnished the starting point for the Supreme Court's review of the authorities7 in the Gold Clause Cases,8 to pursue
such a course is actually to commence in the middle of the chain of cases,a series having its true source in the opinion delivered by the minority in
Hepburn v. Griswold.0 There Mr. Justice Miller raised his voice in argument
so vigorous and cogent that in two years an objection became a decision, a protest became a judgment, a dissent became a momentous prevailing opinion.10
There have been the scoffers-the "debunkers" of judicial impartiality-who
have caused scandal to rear its ugly head and loudly proclaim that political
pragmatism and economic expediency, through the instrumentality of an increased bench, were responsible for the reversal of front by the Court, a change
in which legal principle played no part.'1 But the present Court, divided perhaps
bitterly upon most of the issues involved, endorsed without reservation the
holdings of Justice Miller and his associates 12 who stoutly maintained that the
power to make paper currency legal tender for the payment of debts incurred
anterior to the enactment was, under the proper conditions, 13 resident in the
Congress, a position consistently adhered to by the high Court after an irresolute
start.
Resulting Powers
While the ability to impart to paper money the character of legal tender
must be implied' 4 from the Constitution .today, just as it was sixty-five years
6. 79 U. S. 457 (1871).
7. Again prescinding from the Bronson v. Rodes group of cases. See note 3, supra.
8.
9.

55 Sup. Ct. 407 (1935).
75 U. S. 603 (1869).

10. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U. S. 457 (1871).
11. The baseless nature of the harsh and scandalous interpretations of this reversal is
considered infra pp. 294-295.
12. Mr. Justice Miller's words are found in the dissent in Hepburn v. Griswold, 75
U. S. 603, 626 (1869) while those of his colleagues appear in the opinion of the Court
and the concurring opinion in the Legal Tender Cases, 79 U. S. 457, 554 (1871).
13. Inasmuch as this power was not expressly granted by the Constitution, there must
be found the three requirements laid down by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U. S. 159, 206 (1819), and unfailingly, approved by subsequent decisions;
namely, the end must be *ithin the purview of the Constitution, the means must be
appropriate to the achievement of this design, and they must not be forbidden by the
letter or spirit of the Constitution.
14. It was urged in the Legal Tender Cases, 79 U. S. 457, 550 (1871), that powers
existing under the last clause of U. S. CoNsr. Art. I, § 8, to wit, "The Congress shall have
the power . . . To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for the carrying
into execution of the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution
in the government of the United States or in any department or officer thereof", are
express in that they are mentioned generally, although not named in detail. It Is submitted that such a contention involves a contradiction in terms.

1935]

COMMENTS

ago, it is manifest that, in the terms of the recognized standards 0 set up for the
implication of auxiliary powers, the end of the action is now different and the
means more extensive in scope. But whether the aim of the law is to effectuate
the expressed power of supporting an army, the design predominant when the
first two tests1 6 of this power arose, or the intent is to actualize several such
grants,:L there has been only one serious contention that the end is without
the limits of the supreme law. This occurred when Mr. Justice McReynolds, in
his dissent in the Norman Case,'8 inveighed against the rectitude of the legislature's aim in the gold clause abrogation acts, asserting with emphasis that its
intention was not to establish a monetary system but to reduce sacred obligations of state and citizen to so low an estate that they might be met by
"'inconvertible promises to pay [paper money], of much less value."10 It is
submitted that in searching for ulterior motives he failed to appreciate that
man may act with several ends in view. To seize upon the most illegal
possibility and to ignore a legitimate goal toward which one may well be
striving is hardly calculated to give rise to unshakable conviction in the
mind of the reader. Equally objectionable is the setting up of one effect
of a broad plan (to wit, the transfer of part of the debtor's burden to
the shoulders of the creditor) as the sole purpose for the comprehensive
scheme, judicious or ill-advised though it may be, to revamp the monetary
structure of this country to fit the demands to which it is now subject. It is
respectfully suggested that the dissenting Justice has done one or both of these
things, either of which is sufficient to vitiate his contention. But the means
are invariably the troublesome point upon which the justices disagree, and here
appears the widest divergence between the Legal Tender Acts 0 and the recent
legislation relevant to gold, for the former did not undertake to enter the field
of contracts payable in specie. This fact accounts for the existence of the two
lines of cases 2 ' already alluded to, for when the facts did not concern payment
in coin, the Court refused to consider the matter, and where the obligations were
collectible in gold, the Bronson v. Rodes2 2 series honored the plaintiff's claim to
additional compensation because of the inextension of the acts to such situations.
Yet these latter apparently simple and eminently sound2 judgments were instinct
with three concepts of great moment: (1) The nature of the gold clause as
controlling the subject matter of the contract; (2) The value of the right to
gold; and (3) The efficacy of legal tender in the extinction of debts. Aside
from the first, these thoughts have been accorded but scant attention by the
Court.
15. See note 13, supra.
16. Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U. S. 603 (1869); Legal Tender Cases, 79 U. S. 457 (1871).
17. In Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U. S. 421 (1884), the powers over revenue, finance,
and currency were all invoked as a bass for the Court's implication.
18. Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 55 Sup. Ct. 407, 419 (1935).
19. Id. at 423.
20. 12 STAr. 345 (1862), 31 U. S. C. A. §§ 198, 452, 453 (1926); 12 STAT. 532 (18562), 31
U. S. C. A. §§ 198, 452 (1926); 12 STAT. 709 (1863), 31 U. S. C. A. § 198 (1926).

21. The Hepburn v. Griswold and the Bronson v. Rodes groups.
22.

74 U. S. 229 (1868).

23. The conclusion as to soundness refers to result rather than to reasoning, for diverse
paths were trod to arrive at the one conclusion.
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I
The Commodity Theory
Weighing first that section of this tripartite problem which has most consumed the deliberation of the bench, reflection upon the nature of the gold
clause contract is necessary. The lines of battle have been long since clearly
drawn. On one side it is assailed as a mere agreement to pay dollars or currency, while upon the other it is defended as a pledge to deliver the stated
amount of gold as a commodity, bullion. Chief Justice Hughes has adopted the
definiteness which has characterized all the utterances of the Supreme Court on
this topic and has declared 24 that the majority court "are of the opinion that
the gold clauses now before us were not contracts for payment in gold coin
as a commodity, or in bullion, but were contracts for the payment of money."
In his review of the authorities the Chief Justice confines himself to four, and
while his solution to the problem seems to be the correct one, it is submitted
that the method pursued is little calculated to induce conviction. The first case
considered is Bronson v. Rodes, and the claim is made that, even though the
Court said that the contract was not distinguishable in principle from an agreement to produce bullion of a given weight, this was obiter dictm, inasmuch
as "The decision went upon the assumption 'that engagements to pay coined
dollars may be regarded as ordinary contracts to pay money rather than as contracts to deliver certain weights of standard gold.' ,,25An impartial reading of
the opinion cries out against the averment that the statements on the nature of
the gold clause in the Bronson Case were not necessary to the opinion. After
setting down his conclusion that it was a contract to pay gold as a commodity,
Chief Justice Chase proceeded to assume that the undertaking was not what
he had already decided it to be, and found further support for his stand in the
intent of the Congress. 26 In fine, the learned Chief Justice had made his decision, but to make assurance doubly sure he indulged the assumption that he
was wrong, and found another basis for his opinion. Conceding that it is sometimes difficult to ascertain upon what ground a decision is put, it is submitted
that Chief Justice Hughes has adopted the far less probable of two possibilities and has gratuitously asserted it to be a fact. Butler v. Horwitz,271
appearing on that page of the reports immediately following the Bronson Case,
though mentioned in a string citation, is ignored by Chief Justice Hughes in his
discussion, although it is most enlightening in that Chase, who wrote both opinions and is therefore the best able to know the foundation upon which the earlier
24. Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 55 Sup. Ct. 407, 413 (1935).
25. Ibid.
26. 74 U. S. 229, 251 (1868).
The following quotation demonstrates the ancillary
nature of the discussion which is now averred to be the ratio decidendi: "Nor do we think
it necessary now to examine the question whether the clauses of the currency acts, making
the United States notes legal tender, are warranted by the Constitution.
"But we will proceed to inquire whether, upon the assumption that those clauses were so
warranted, and upon the further assumption that engagements to pay coined dollars may
be regarded as ordinary contracts to pay money rather than as contracts to deliver certain
weights of standard gold, it can be maintained that a contract to pay coined money may be
satisfied by a tender of United States notes.
"Is this a performance of the contract within the true intent of the acts?"
27. 74 U. S. 258 (1868).
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ruling was built, declares that "The principles which determine the case of
Bronson v. Rodes, [sic] will govern our judgment in this case."28 He then
proceeds unequivocally and forcibly to reaffirm that a contract to pay in coin
is "in substance and legal effect" an agreement to furnish the promisee with a
commodity.2 9
The discussion in the Norman Case then proceeds to Trebilcock v.Wilson,20
which admittedly holds that the term "in specie" did not make the obligation
payable in chattels, but rather was an indication of which of two kinds of money
the contract demanded. Thompson v. Butler3 ' seemingly adheres to the same
doctrine, but the inimical theory again makes its appearance in the opinion of
Chief justice Waite32 in Gregory v. Morris.P3 Chief Justice Hughes dismisses
the latter case with "Compare Gregory v. Morris"I While on principle it is
safe to say that the parties were bargaining for money, coin, or currency, rather
than chattels, commodities, or bullion, it is submitted that the treatment in the
Norman Case amounts to a strained construction in a rather dubious effort to
align authority on the side of reason.
II
Value
It is, of course, clear that if the commodity theory prevails, the second part
of this three-fold question, value, takes on added importance. Yet even aside
from this, value plays a significant but misunderstood r6le in the Gold Clause
decisions. It must be constantly remembered that in the post-Civil War times
the obligees in the gold clause contracts were substantially harmed by the debased currency, 4 whereas the purchasing power of the present unit of value
has not sunk below the worth of the dollar loaned.P This should be a con28. Id. at 259.
29. Id. at 260.

"A contract to pay a certain sum in gold and silver coin is, in sub-

stance and legal effect, a contract to deliver a certain weight of gold and silver of a
certain fineness, to be ascertained by count. Damages for non-performance of such a
contract may be recovered at law as for non-performance of a contract to deliver bullion
or any other commodity.'
30. 79 U. S. 687 (1871).
31. 95 U. S. 694 (1877).

32. It is noteworthy that Chief Justice Waite also wrote Thompson v. Butler, ibid.
33. 96 U. S. 619 (1877).

The Chief Justice, id. at 625, says: "If the contract had been

in terms for the delivery of so much gold bullion, there is no doubt but the court might
have directed the jury to find the value of the bullion in currency and bring in a verdict
accordingly. But we think, as was thought in Bronson v. Rodes, such a cae is not
really distinguishable from this!'
34. Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U. S. 603, 603 (1869). At varying times intermediate
the Legal Tender Acts and 1869 the gold dollar was worth from $1.20 to $2.85 in paper

money.
35. While it would be impossible to compare the prevailing index numbers with those
in existence when each gold clause bond or agreement was executed, the subztantial
accuracy of this statement is generally conceded. The common view is that, if petitioners
were being paid in accordance with the purchasing power of the dollar, they would
receive less than the face value of their bonds.
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trolling consideration because there is no free market for gold" in this country.
It is fundamentally unfair, therefore, to measure damage, even under the commodity theory, by the price of gold obtaining in the United States, notwithstanding the fact that it was just in 1870, since the precious metal's sale is now
hedged about with arbitrary restrictions. But realizing that the "market price"
of gold affords no true norm of damage suffered through the legislative destruction of public and private agreements, the plaintiffs in the Gold Clause Cases
have espoused a measure which finds no countenance or sanction in the past.
To state the comparison is to expose the fallacy. The plaintiffs would adopt
the total number of grains of gold receivable under the literal and rigorous interpretation of the contract as the dividend, and, employing the present quantity
allotted to each dollar as the divisor, they would regard the quotient as the
number of dollars to which they are entitled.3 7 That the Legal Tender Cases
stand for no such proposition is readily demonstrable. The notes then issued
had no gold content, but were supported by the naked undertaking of the
government.38 Utilizing, then, zero as the divisor, no matter how few grains of
gold the rigid construction of the contract exacted, the answer would always
approach infinity. Clear it is that none was so misguided as to advance such
a contention. Since the plaintiffs' gauge of injury gains no force from authority
and must be rejected as inequitable on principle, it appears that the petitioners
and the dissent which favors them derive meagre support from their declaration
that they have not been awarded the proper "value" of their rights.
III
Legal Tender
Last in importance in the triparted question under consideration, if prolixity
of judicial opinion is the criterion by which its significance is evaluated, but
foremost in the rank of reasonable bases for the justification of the government's
0
action in readjusting the monetary structure is the recognized principle" that
anything will discharge a debt for which it is legal tender. Whether an article
be precious metal or intrinsically worthless stone, illuminated parchment or un36. Perry v. United States, 55 Sup. Ct. 432, 438 (1935). It is submitted that gold Is
in a position somewhat analogous to that at least nominally occupied by intoxicants
during the life of the Eighteenth Article of Amendment. After flourishing as a commodity
in the days of the "Black Friday" of 1869 and later (even though it was at the same
time legal tender), the precious metal has lost its exchange value, just as liquor did. Cf.
Samuels v. McCurdy, 267 U. S. 188 (1925).
37. Illustrative of the general theory of the petitioners is Nortz v. United States,
55 Sup. Ct. 428, 429 (1935).
38. See Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U. S. 603, 607 (1869). 2 BARD AND BrARD, Tnu
RisE oF AamcAN CIILIZATiON (1927) 72.
109 (1864);
39. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U. S. 457 (1871); Hull. v. Kohlsaat, 36 Ill.
(1864);
174
Iowa
18
Bates,
v.
Hintrager
(1865);
273
Whetstone v. Colley, 36 Ill.

Metropolitan Bank v. Van Dyck, 27 N. Y. 400 (1863); Hague v. Powers, 39 Barb. 427
While the Hull, Whetstone,
(N. Y. 1683); Sholenberger v. Brinton, 52 Pa. 9 (1866).
payable in gold to be disobligations
permitting
in
far
too
go
Cases
and Shollenberger
charged by paper currency under the Legal Tender Acts, this by no means lessens their
force in respect to the point for which they are cited above.
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adorned paper, if it is legal tender, a creditor is bound to accept it in satisfaction
of his claim. Although the Legal Tender Acts provided that the paper money
therein authorized be deemed legal tender for the payment of all debts, public
and private, this was construed to refer to "all debts payable in money genrally," 40 and so the cases arising under this statute supported the above proposition, the insufficiency of paper currency to liquidate gold clause obligations
being attributable to the intent of the Congress rather than to any infirmity in
legal tender as such. Even Mr. Justice McReynolds does not question the
valid discharge of antecedent obligations by the newly created legal tender,4
but vigorously challenges the legitimacy of the aim of the Congress in enacting
this legislation.2 Assuming temporarily, however, the soundness under the
circumstances of the implication of the power utilized, it is insusceptible of
contradiction that all debts,' 3 whether calling for gold or not, may be satisfied
in paper money, for the federal lawmakers have left no doubt that they meant
the new, irredeemable currency to be legal tender for all obligations, without
limitation or qualification 4 4 Other considerations become collateral and
academic. Whatever is due in dollars (of any kind) is payable in legal tender.
No precatory words of the debtor need entreat the obligee to accept. It is now,
as always,45 the right of the obligor to demand that his offer be not rejected.
It is, consequently, obligatory to conclude that since the petitioners' claims of
unjust deprivation of value are without foundation, and inasmuch as these
were not contracts for settled amounts of commodities, but for money and payable therefore in legal tender, the contested legislation constituted means not
prohibited by the letter or spirit of the Constitution 0c for the attainment of the
desired end.
40. This is the unanimous holding of the cases from Bronson v. Rodes, 74 U. S. 229
(1863), to the present. See Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R, 55 Sup. Ct. 407, 413 (1935).
41. Id. at 422. "The plan under review in the Legal Tender Cases was declared within
the limits of the Constitution. . . . The conclusions there announced are not now
questioned ......
42. Id. at 423.
43. This is not intended to include debts payable otherwise than in money, as, eg., in
chattels.
44. 43 STAT. 112 (1933), 31 U. S. C. A. § 463 (1934). "Resolved by the Senate and
House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That

(a).... Every obligation heretofore or hereafter incurred ... -hall be discharged upon
payment, dollar for dollar, in any coin or currency which at the time of payment is
legal tender for public and private debts.
"(b) As used in this resolution the term 'obligation' means an obligation (including every

obligation of and to the United States, excepting currency) payable in money of the
United States...!

This definition emphasizes the importance of showing the contracts to be for the
payment of gold as money rather than as a commodity.
45. It is a part of the history of this country that the creditors, even from the
earliest days, have not possessed the liberty to reject payment in legal tender. 1 MctAsz r,
,r
oE TH UNITED STATES (1833) 285-286; 1 BEARm AzD BrAZ
HI TORY or Tm PEoPL OF
THE R[sa or A1=csA Cniv=io (1927) 306 semuble.
46. While the Gold Clause Cases are devoid of attacks directed against the power of
the government to issue paper money and, in addition to impart to it the magic of legal
tender, it is necessary to concede that a powerful argument may be built up from the
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The Propriety of the Means
It is vain, as a legal proposition, to meditate upon the appropriateness of the
measures chosen by the Congress, for if they partake of this quality in any
degree they are adequate 7 To press further into the question would be to
abandon the judicial forum and enter the legislative hall. The Court once
went astray on this topic, 48 going into the necessity and suitability of the
means, and, substituting the discretion of the bench for that of the legislature,
40
found the Legal Tender Acts unconstitutional. The error was shortly righted,
but not without drawing down calumny and opprobrium upon the heads of the
justices.50 Thus to malign the reputations of the then incumbents is to villify
despite rather than because of the facts.
During the Civil War decade the numerical constitution of the Supreme
Court was in a state of fluxP The change from eight to nine justices in 186952
is not, therefore, to be looked upon as the solitary move of its kind with a
sinister background, but rather as a final step in several endeavors to arrive at
an ideal number. This is amply supported by the fact that the law making
mandatory the enlarged bench was passed some months prior to the decision in
Hepburn v. Griswold, and the appointments of Justices Strong and Bradley were
intent of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention. Many of these representatives
expressed themselves in no uncertain terms as to their distrust and contempt for paper
money. Apparently as a result of these bitter diatribes against printed currency, an
express power "to emit bills of credit" was refused to the Congress. WAmm , T=n UAiaNO
OF TE CoNs=TrUioN (1928) 693-696. Mr. Justice Bradley, in his concurring opinion In
the Legal Tender Cases, 79 U. S. 457, 554 (1871), as an explanation for the unwillingness
to permit this grant to appear in the Constitution, maintains, id. at 559, that the unnecessary nature of the provision was as great a factor in its being withheld as was the
hostility toward it. Whether or not this is the correct interpretation of the Convention's
action, the fact is that the objection which it seeks to remove has been abandoned.
47. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U. S. 159, 207 (1819). In the present situation,
the entire absence of suitability of the means to the end desired cannot be seriously
maintained.
48. Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U. S. 603 (1869). It is interesting to note that Chief
Justice Chase, who wrote the opinion undertaking to prove the unnecessary nature of the
Legal Tender Acts, was the Secretary of the Treasury who, after some early doubts,
counseled President Lincoln to adopt them as indispensable measures.
49. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U. S. 457 (1871).
50. After the Legal Tender Acts were declared unconstitutional by a vote of five
to three in the Hepburn Case, Mr. Justice Grier, a member of the majority, retired
because of ill health. The Congress had shortly prior to that time increased the number
of justices from eight to nine, and so two appointments became nccv-ary. When these
two voted in the Legal Tender Cases with the former minority, making it a five to four
majority, defamatory charges were hurled with abandon.
51. The Act of March 3, 1863, enlarged the Court from nine members to ten, but
the subsequent enactment of July 23, 1866, provided for a reduction to seven by prohibiting further appointments until the number was sufficiently diminished. Then followed
the act in controversy, that of April 10, 1869, which took effect on the first Monday of
the succeeding December. Since the Hepburn Case was not decided even in conference
until November 27, 1869, the guiltlessness of the Congress is evident.
52. See note 51, supra.
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made a few hours before the disclosure of the decision 5 3 the reversal of which
is asserted to have been the predominant reason for their selection.P4 It is
therefore clear almost to the point of demonstration that the President did not
"pack" the Supreme Court in order to secure a reversal of Hepburn v. Griswold,
-equally manifest it is that learned and able justices were selected, who knew
their rights and appreciated their duties while retaining the courage to assert
and perform them in a way perhaps impolitic but nevertheless legitimate.
While it would be indeed rash and precipitous to assume a dogmatic position
upon a subject which provokes disagreement among the eminent jurists not only
of this country but of the world cr yet in consideration of the legitimacy of the
end, the appropriateness of the means, and the consistency thereof with the
letter and spirit of the Constitutionr--in view of the existence of all these
essential elements, it is submitted that the gold clause legislation 0 represents a
proper exercise of the auxiliary powers delegated by the Constitution to the
Congress of the United States.

THE DECLINE OF Caveat Emptor IN THE SALE OF FooD.-In recent
years the law of sales of personal property has assumed an increasing importance.
Modem methods of distribution and of large scale manufacture have rendered
many long-tried rules inadequate to cope with the problems of the contemporary
situation.' Not the least insistent of the new demands for readjustment relates to the measure of liability of the manufacturer or vendor for injuries
resulting from the consumption of unwholesome foods. The vast increase in
the sale of food in cans and sealed packages has deprived the consumer of the
cAx Lxwvnns (1909) 359. There is no evidence of the
53. 6 Laws, GFA.T Aia
egregious breach of ethics of disclosing the decision before it was read from the bench.
Id. at 359-360.
54. A further manifestation of the innocence of the increment to this Court is that,
prior to the ultimate selection of justices, Secretary of War Stanton and Attorney General
Hoar were chosen by President Grant to fill the vacant posts. Mr. Stanton died before
taking office and Mr. Hoar's appointment was refused confirmation by the Senate. With
this disappears the last vestige of insidious plot attempted to be connected with the
Strong-Bradley elevation to the Supreme Bench, since it could not have taken place
without these almost unpredictable happenings.
55. The decisions of the House of Lords, Feist v. Sochitd Intercommunale Beige
d'Electridt, [1934] A. C. 161, and of the Permanent Court of International Justice,
Cases of Serbian and Brazilian Loans, Publications P. C. I. J., Series A, Nos. 20-21 (1929)9
are regarded as indicative of a tendency hostile to the Gold Clause Cases, even apart
from the absence of the background of the Constitutional Law of the United States.
56. The provisions relative to private bonds are the only ones in contemplation here.
1. See Hertzler v. Manshum, 228 Alich. 416, 200 N. W. 155, 156 (1924); Baxter v. Ford
Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P. (2d) 409, 412, (1932). (Recognizing the influence of
modern advertising in creating a demand for goods.)

